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ABSTRACT 
The Lisbon Treaty has introduced significant changes in the field of EU security and 
defence. On the one hand, important institutional reforms, such as the creation of a 
renewed High Representative, have of course a great impact on this policy field. On the 
other hand, the Lisbon Treaty has also introduced specific innovations in the security and 
defence of the European Union. The mutual defence clause and the new mechanisms for 
flexible cooperation such as the permanent structured cooperation, are only some of the 
key innovations. Generally, the European Security and Defence Policy receives its own 
section in the Treaty on European Union and is rebranded as Common Security and Defence 
Policy. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty sets the objective for a common policy in this field. 
However, does this reform really provide for the means for the realization of such a 
common policy? Furthermore, does the Lisbon Treaty increase the importance of CSDP or is 
the increasing importance of this policy field just reflected in the Treaty text? These are 
the main questions that the present paper attempts to address through the analysis of the 
new institutional setting of the post-Lisbon security and defence policy, as well as through 
the examination of the specific innovations in this area.   
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1 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
The present paper deals with the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon1 in the area of the EU 
security and defence policy. Thus, the paper focuses mainly on ‘provisions in the Common 
Security and Defence Policy’2 (CSDP). Nonetheless, CSDP is ‘an integral part of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy’3 (CFSP). Hence, the examination of the provisions concerning 
the area of CFSP seems inevitable to the extent that these provisions are also applicable to 
CSDP, or at least affect it. 
A big proportion of the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty concerns the area of 
CFSP/CSDP. More specifically, almost half (25 out of 62) of the amendments in the Treaty 
on European Union deal with CFSP/CSDP issues, and most of these amendments concern 
specifically CSDP, or at least affect it. Apart from the amendments in the TEU, reforms 
affecting CSDP can also be found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) (e.g. solidarity clause)4, as well as in Protocols (e.g. Protocol on permanent 
structured cooperation).5 
The reforms that entered into force in the area of CSDP are, with very few exceptions, 
identical to the ones proposed under the draft Constitutional Treaty. The exceptions 
concern mainly reforms of political and symbolic significance, and are of no particular 
interest from a legal point of view. For example, the “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” of 
the Constitutional Treaty under the Lisbon Treaty is rebranded as “High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”. Other minor changes are introduced, 
such as the addition of declarations, etc. 
The Treaty reforms in CSDP, and more generally in CFSP, aim at producing a more coherent 
European Union and at the enhancement of its role as a world actor. Apart from important 
institutional changes concerning generally CFSP (e.g. High Representative, European 
External Action Service etc.), the Reform Treaty has brought key innovations in the field of 
the EU security and defence policy. Apart from the military aspects of the security and 
defence policy, the Treaty also institutionalises its civilian aspects. Major changes focus on 
capabilities development (establishment of the permanent structured cooperation and 
incorporation of the European Defence Agency into the Treaty). Apart from the permanent 
structured cooperation, other forms of flexible cooperation are provided for in the Treaty, 
i.e. the enhanced cooperation and the coalitions of the able and willing. Lastly, other 
important innovations are introduced, such as the mutual defence and solidarity clauses, 
and mechanisms for rapid financing of CSDP. 
                                                
1Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty or Treaty of Lisbon or Reform Treaty]. 
2Section 2 of Chapter 2 of the Treaty on European Union (consolidated version 2010) [hereinafter 
TEU-L]. 
3Article 42(1) TEU-L. 
4Article 222 of the consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
[hereinafter TFEU]. 
5Protocol (No 10) annexed to the EU Treaties on permanent structured cooperation established by 
Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union [hereinafter Protocol 10]. 
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The European Security and Defence Policy, which is relabelled as Common Security and 
Defence Policy, has now its own section in the TEU-L, receiving ‘an extended presence in 
the new Treaty’.6 Indeed, the ESDP, which was not even referred to as such7 in the Nice 
Treaty, is now incorporated into the Treaty on European Union as a separate policy field 
with its own specific provisions. This policy field is not called “European” security and 
defence policy, as its founders chose to name it outside the framework of the Treaties, but 
is rebranded as “Common” Security and Defence Policy. What exactly does this rebranding 
mean? Does it just signify ‘a new level of ambition’?8 Do the changes of the Lisbon Treaty 
really create the framework for a common policy, or does the EU security and defence 
policy remain an area of cooperation? And lastly, does the Lisbon Treaty increase the 
importance of the security and defence policy, or is the increasing importance of this policy 
field just reflected in the Treaty text? An answer to these questions can be given only after 
the examination of the new institutional architecture of CSDP and the specific innovations 
in this area. Through the examination of these reforms it will be possible to compare the 
ESDP and CSDP, to define the exact character of the new EU security and defence policy, 
and lastly, to assess the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on this policy field. 
1.2 From Nice to Lisbon 
The Nice Treaty was until recently the legal basis for the security and defence policy of the 
European Union. This Treaty had established permanent political and military structures 
(the Political and Security Committee, the European Union Military Committee, the 
European Union Military Staff, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability), ‘in order to 
enable the European Union to fully assume its responsibilities for crisis management’.9  
The European Security and Defence Policy had already been created by the Heads of States 
and Governments at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, long before the entry into force of the 
Nice Treaty. However, the European Security and Defence Policy, which has been 
operational since 2003, had not been incorporated into the Treaty framework by the Nice 
reform. 
The draft Constitutional Treaty (2003),10 provided for reforms in the field of ESDP. 
However, the rejections of the Constitutional Treaty, which were anyhow not connected to 
the amendments in security and defence, delayed the incorporation of these reforms into 
the Treaties. After the “period for reflection” that followed these rejections,  
the Brussels European Council agreed to an IGC for the adoption of a new Treaty. 
This new Treaty, which was signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007 and which due to 
ratification difficulties entered into force two years later (1 December 2009), contained 
reforms that were almost identical with the Constitutional Treaty as regards CSDP.  
The “Lisbon Treaty” incorporates into the Treaty framework the European (now Common) 
Security and Defence Policy and all its developments since the Cologne European Council in 
1999. 
Despite the deadlock concerning the Treaty reforms lasting from 2003 till the end of 2009, 
the EU did not stop developing in security and defence matters. Since 1 December 2003 the 
EU has undertaken approximately 24 military operations and civilian missions, not only on 
                                                
6Mölling 2008, 2. 
7As “European Security and Defence Policy”. 
8Mölling 2008, 1. 
9Council of the European Union 2010. 
10The European Convention 2010. 
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the European continent but also in Africa and Asia. On 12 December 2003 a European 
Security Strategy was drawn. The European Defence Agency was established within the 
framework of the European Union by a joint action of the Council on 12 July 2004. The EU 
battle-groups were created the same year, on 22 November. These and many other 
important developments took place within the European Security and Defence Policy after 
the entry into force of the Nice Treaty and before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. 
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2 EXPANDED OBJECTIVES, TASKS AND ASPIRATIONS OF CSDP 
The new provision of Article 42 TEU-L contains more expansively outlined objectives, tasks, 
and aspirations of CSDP. This provision incorporates into the Treaty framework the 
objective of capabilities development. Furthermore, Article 43 TEU-L specifies the tasks ‘in 
the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means’. Lastly, paragraph 2 of 
Article 42 expresses the future vision for the development of a common defence. 
2.1 Capabilities Development 
Generally, the aim of CSDP is to ‘provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on 
civilian and military assets’, which may be used ‘on missions outside the Union for  
peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance 
with the principles of the United Nations Charter’.11 However, the Union does not have its 
own army, nor can it provide police officers, judges, or prosecutors for the purposes of the 
missions and operations. The performance of the tasks under 42(1), and more specifically 
43 TEU-L, ‘shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States’,12 and 
thus the ‘Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union 
for the implementation of CSDP’.13 
Since the inauguration of the ESDP operations and missions the central problem has been 
the shortfall in capabilities. Thus, the main objective expressed in the Treaty with regard 
to CSDP is the enhancement of the military capabilities of the Member States. The need to 
overcome shortfalls in the field of military capabilities (logistics, intelligence, deployability 
of forces, etc.), which was expressed in the European Security Strategy, as well as in the 
Headline Goal 2010, and which was already dealt with by the Capability Development 
Mechanism and the European Defence Agency, is now expressed in the Treaty text. 
Whereas the wording of the Nice Treaty was limited to cooperation in the field of 
armaments,14 the current Treaty framework expands cooperation generally to military 
capabilities development. Apart from the general obligation of the Member States to 
progressively improve their military capabilities, two innovations are incorporated into the 
Treaty for the realization of this goal. First, the already existing European Defence Agency, 
which now receives a treaty basis, has as its overall task the development of military 
capabilities. Second, the new mechanism of permanent structured cooperation aims at the 
coordination of military capabilities development.    
However, this commitment for capacity development is restricted to the military 
components of CSDP. Thus, there is no similar objective expressed in the Treaty concerning 
the development of the civilian aspects of CSDP (police, strengthening the rule of law, civil 
administration, civil protection missions), nor are there any mechanisms provided for this 
purpose, although they are also required in this area. 
                                                
1142(1) TEU-L. 
12Ibid. 
13Article 42(3) TEU-L. 
14Article 17 TEU-N. 
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2.2 Expansion of the Petersberg Tasks 
The scope of the so-called “Petersberg Tasks” is extended by the Lisbon Treaty. The 
Petersberg Tasks, which were set out in the Petersberg Declaration,15 and later 
incorporated into the TEU by the Amsterdam Treaty,16 originally included only 
‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peacemaking’. The Lisbon Treaty has expanded the range of the 
abovementioned tasks by adding new possibilities for action, i.e. ‘joint disarmament 
operations’, ‘military advice and assistance tasks’, ‘conflict prevention’, ‘post-conflict 
stabilization’ and ‘the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in 
combating terrorism in their territories’.17 
Paragraph 2 of Article 43 provides for the conditions under which such tasks are 
implemented. In particular, the ‘objectives and scope’ as well as ‘the general conditions 
for their implementation’ are defined by a Council decision. The coordination of civilian 
and military aspects of such tasks are under the responsibility of the High Representative, 
who shall act ‘under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the 
Political and Security Committee’.18 
2.3 Prospects for a common defence 
The Lisbon Treaty confirms the commitment on the progressive framing of a common Union 
defence policy, as expressed already in the Amsterdam Treaty,19 which will lead to a 
common defence.20 However, the Amsterdam language is slightly amended. The phrase 
‘might lead to a common defence’ used in the Amsterdam Treaty, is replaced by the phrase 
‘will lead to a common defence’, making the realization of this future vision seem more 
certain. 
Another change in this provision concerns the procedure by which the decision for a 
common defence will be adopted. The Treaty implicitly adds the unanimity requirement for 
the adoption of such a decision by the Council. Nothing was mentioned under the 
Amsterdam Treaty as regards the decision-making procedure in such a case, and that was 
justified, since unanimity was in any case the only applicable method for decisions having 
military and defence implications. However, unanimity remains today the rule in CSDP. This 
rightfully raises the question, why now the Treaty explicitly requires unanimity in this case. 
An explanation given is that ‘the additional caveat may be an additional attempt to 
dissuade the use of enhanced cooperation (now requiring nine Member States) which is 
applicable in all areas of the Treaty including [CSDP]’.21 
Furthermore, the remaining reference to the respect of the specific character of the 
security and defence policy of certain Member States, and of the obligations of Member 
States under NATO demonstrates that, although the Member States recognise the need for 
a common defence, they are still not willing to achieve this cause at any cost. The national 
interest of the Member States remains their first priority. Therefore, only to the extent 
                                                
15Petersberg Declaration 1992. 
16Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union (consolidated version 1997) [hereinafter TEU-A]. 
17Article 43 TEU-L. 
18Article 43(2) TEU-L. 
19Article 2 TEU-A. 
20Article 42(2) TEU-L. 
21Quille 2008, 5. 
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that these national interests are not at stake, the states shall be bound by this commitment 
for deeper integration in the field of defence. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that two innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty could be 
considered as contributing towards the creation of a common defence. The provision of the 
mutual defence clause, as it is argued, establishes the ‘political legitimacy’ of a future 
common defence.22 However, it should be noted that in the same provision, NATO is 
characterised as the ‘forum for implementation’ of the collective defence of certain 
Member States;23 something that could be interpreted as excluding the possibility for a 
future common European defence.24 The second innovation is the permanent structured 
cooperation, a mechanism originally designed with the prospect of creating a common 
defence in the future. As Combarieu notes ‘the original aim of the proposed permanent 
structured cooperation was defence within the European Union leading to the formation of 
a European army, an aspiration often expressed by Germany’.25 
In conclusion, the wording of Article 42(2) TEU-L demonstrates the ‘embryonic nature of 
CSDP for a common defence’.26 The prospect for the establishment of a common European 
defence appears to be more certain with the Lisbon Treaty. However, the realization of a 
common defence remains a future aspiration. Two innovations introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty, the mutual defence clause and the permanent structured cooperation, may be 
perceived as catalysts for the achievement of this aspiration. 
                                                
22Combarieu 2008, 4. 
23Article 42(7) TEU-L. 
24Combarieu 2008, 5. 
25Ibid. 3. 
26Dagand 2008, 7. 
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3 THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 The role of the new actors 
The following subchapters discuss the role of the two new posts within CSDP, i.e. the post 
of the new High Representative of the Union, and the post of the newly created full-time 
President of the European Council. Although these two posts are considered as ‘central new 
institutional arrangement[s] […] within the new Treaty’,27 they are not equally important 
within CSDP. 
 
3.1.1 The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
Within CSDP the prominent role is given to the High Representative of Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. Although the post of a High Representative was already introduced by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, it is worth analysing the role of the upgraded High Representative 
within the Common Security and Defence Policy, not only because of his/her increased 
powers and responsibilities, but also because of the fact that now he/she functions within a 
completely new institutional setting. 
The new double-hatted High Representative, who is the foremost voice of the Union in 
Foreign Affairs has received new powers and responsibilities within the field of CSDP. The 
competences and tasks of the former High Representative mentioned in the TEU-N text 
were limited to assisting the Council in CSDP matters by contributing to the formulation, 
preparation and implementation of policy decisions, as well as by conducting political 
dialogue with third parties on behalf of the Council,28 and finally to assisting the Presidency 
as a Secretary-General of the Council.29 
The competences and tasks of the High Representative in the area of CSDP, or his/her 
powers that at least affect the area of CSDP, are significantly extended by the Lisbon 
Treaty. It can be generally said that the present High Representative has the same mandate 
with that provided for the “Union Minister of Foreign Affairs”, of the draft Constitutional 
Treaty. 
The relevant provisions of the Reform Treaty partly confer to the High Representative more 
power and authority, and partly codify previous practice. New competences and tasks, such 
as the power to make proposals, are awarded to the High Representative in the area of 
CSDP. He/she shall exercise these powers in his/her capacity as High 
Representative/President of the Foreign Affairs Council and not under his/her Commission 
hat. The Lisbon Treaty formally empowers the High Representative to represent the Union 
in CSDP. Although the pre-Lisbon High Representative in practice also represented the 
Union externally, this power was not formally conferred to him. Furthermore, the High 
Representative as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council succeeds the prior rotating 
presidency in CSDP matters and acquires the latter’s responsibilities. Lastly, as the 
                                                
27Wessels and Bopp 2008, 19. 
28Article 26 of the Treaty on European Union (consolidated version 2006) [hereinafter TEU-N]. 
29Article 18(3) TEU-N. 
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successor of the High Representative/General Secretary, the new High Representative 
undertakes his duties with regard to CSDP. 
 
3.1.2 The President of the European Council 
It is also worth examining the role of the newly created permanent President of the Union, 
since from a political perspective he chairs the most powerful institution, the European 
Council. His tasks and responsibilities specifically in the field of CFSP, and thus in CSDP, are 
not sufficiently specified in Article 15(6) TEU-L. 
According to 15(6) TEU-L, which enlists the general duties of the President, like the High 
Representative the President has also the task to ensure the external representation of the 
Union with regard to CSDP. The wording of the Treaty ‘without prejudice to the powers of 
the High Representative’ indicates that there is an overlap of tasks, which could possibly 
lead to a conflict of competences. Furthermore, the President, and not the European 
Council, is now under the obligation to keep the European Parliament informed by 
presenting to it a report after each meeting of the European Council.30 And since CSDP 
issues are also discussed in the European Council meetings, the European Parliament is kept 
informed by the President regarding developments in this field. Lastly, as President of the 
European Council he has also other general competences defined in 15(6) TEU-L. 
Generally, as Wessels and Bopp comment, the Lisbon Treaty creates a post of a President 
who is something more than a coordinating chairperson with representative functions, and 
something less than a strong President seen to represent the Union on the international 
scene.31 Indeed, as regards CSDP, apart from his role as a representative of the Union at his 
level, his powers are limited to chairing the European Council meetings. Within CSDP it is 
the High Representative and not the President of the European Council who is given a 
prominent role by the Lisbon Treaty. 
3.2 The institutions 
Although the Lisbon Treaty is supposed to have abolished the old pillar structure, it is 
argued that in practice CFSP, and thus CSDP, remains ‘a distinctive pillar in that the roles 
of the Commission, European Court of Justice and European Parliament are very heavily 
circumscribed’.32 In this sub-chapter the role of the most important institutions in the area 
of CSDP will be examined. This shall help to ascertain whether and to which degree the 
above statement is accurate. The analysis will not be limited to EU institutions, but will 
extend to national and transnational institutions that also play a role within CSDP.   
 
3.2.1 The parliamentary assemblies 
Parliamentary scrutiny in CSDP takes place at three levels. At the supranational level, the 
European Parliament has oversight over CSDP. At national level, the national parliaments 
scrutinise the choices of the national governments regarding CSDP. And lastly, at 
transnational level, the ESDA, the Assembly of the WEU, also exercises democratic control 
on EU defence and security issues. 
                                                
30Article 15(6d) TEU-L. 
31Wessels and Bopp 2008, 18. 
32Whitman and Juncos 2009, 30. 
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3.2.1.1 The European Parliament 
The European Parliament basically retains its supervisory and consultative role, regarding 
CSDP matters. However, the Lisbon Treaty introduces certain changes which are worth 
examining. 
Since the High Representative is now a member of the Commission and the consent of the 
European Parliament is required for the appointment of the whole Commission, the 
European Parliament has acquired democratic control over the High Representative.33 
Similarly, the European Parliament retains the motion of censure on the whole Commission, 
and thus also on the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission. Therefore, 
although the Treaty provides for democratic oversight over the High Representative/Vice 
President of the Commission, the possibility for the European Parliament to control the 
High Representative/Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council to a certain degree through 
these political mechanisms, is theoretically not excluded. 
Furthermore, as was already indicated above, the High Representative shall regularly 
consult the European Parliament and duly take into consideration its views on CSDP 
matters.34 Today the duty to consult the European Parliament remains limited to the main 
aspects and basic choices of CSDP, and does not extend to operational decisions. As 
mentioned above,35 the European Parliament is also informed by the new President of the 
European Council about developments in CSDP, i.e. CSDP issues which were discussed in the 
European Council meetings.36 Furthermore, the European Parliament retains the power to 
ask questions to the Council and make recommendations to it. In addition to that, it may 
now make recommendations also to the High Representative.37 
Moreover, another change with regard to the powers of the European Parliament is that the 
debates within this body have expanded to CSDP matters. It is now explicitly provided that 
debates are held specifically on the progress in implementing the Common Security and 
Defence Policy, and not just generally on the Common Foreign and Security Policy.38 
Furthermore, the frequency of these debates has increased from once to twice a year. 
As previously the European Parliament does not have any influence via the budgetary 
procedure in matters having military and defence implications, because expenses 
concerning such issues are not charged to the Union budget.39 In particular, Article 41(2) 
excludes from the Union budget only expenses arising from military operations. Thus, a 
contrario, expenditure arising from civilian components of CSDP (police, rule of law, 
civilian administration, civil protection missions), are financed by the Union budget. 
Consequently, the European Parliament still does not have any oversight over the financing 
of military operations, but retains oversight over expenditure deriving from civilian 
missions. 
According to Wessels and Bopp, ‘these treaty provisions document the marginal role of the 
European Parliament which remains restricted to acting as a forum in this policy field’.40 
                                                
33Article 17(7) TEU-L. 
34Article 36(1) TEU-L. 
35See above subchapter 3.1.2. 
36Article 15(6d) TEU-L. 
37Article 36 TEU-L. 
38Article 36(2) TEU-L. 
39Article 41(2) TEU-L. 
40Wessels and Bopp 2008, 15. 
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This statement is to a certain degree accurate. Nevertheless, as the European Parliament is 
granted the task to exercise democratic control over the High Representative/Vice 
President of the Commission, to some extent it also acquires powers over the High 
Representative/Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council. 
3.2.1.2 The national parliaments 
As regards the national Parliaments, the Lisbon Treaty has increased their powers. 
However, the only reform that directly affects the Common Security and Defence Policy 
concerns the interparliamentary cooperation between national Parliaments, and with the 
European Parliament. More specifically, the Treaty provides for a conference of 
Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs, which, inter alia, will be able to organise 
interparliamentary conferences in order to debate matters of security and defence policy.41 
This innovation is rightly characterised as ‘insufficient’, since it affords the possibility for a 
conference which would only be the framework for dialogue and not real democratic 
control.42   
The most significant power given to the national parliaments by Reform Treaty, namely the 
possibility to challenge draft legislative acts for violation of the principle of subsidiarity,43 
is not applicable in CSDP, since the adoption of legislative acts is excluded in this area.44 
In sum, the reforms with regard to the national parliaments reflect the Member States’ 
desire to give to their national assemblies an ‘enhanced role within the Union and to 
promote cooperation between them, and with the European Parliament’.45 However, as 
seen above, the powers granted by the Reform Treaty to the national parliaments 
especially in the field of CSDP are limited. Nonetheless, although the Lisbon Treaty does 
not really enhance the role of the national assemblies, it is worth mentioning that due to 
the intergovernmental character of CSDP, debates anyway take place at national level, and 
thus real scrutiny on defence issues remains within the national parliamentary assemblies.46   
3.2.1.3 The European Security and Defence Assembly 
Lastly, the Common Security and Defence Policy is scrutinised also at transnational level by 
the Assembly of the WEU, which was recently transformed into the “European Security and 
Defence Assembly” (ESDA). This assembly is composed of national parliamentarians and has 
oversight over the government-constituted Council of the WEU, and therefore has 
democratic control over European security and defence matters. As a consultative 
institution it has no veto powers on the decisions of the WEU Council. 
However, on 31 March 2010 it was announced by the President of the Permanent Council of 
the WEU that by the end of June 2011 the WEU will be dissolved. As the President of the 
WEU Parliamentary Assembly said, a new arrangement is to be found to replace ESDA and 
                                                
41Title II of Protocol (No 1) annexed to the EU Treaties on the role of the national parliaments in the 
European Union [hereinafter Protocol 1]. 
42European Security and Defence Assembly 2010. 
43Title I of Protocol 1. 
44Articles 24(1) and 31(1) TEU-L. 
45Walter 2009b, 15. 
46Rosén 2008, 9; Walter 2009b, 15. 
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‘it is important and very necessary for interparliamentary scrutiny to continue in the 
Assembly until the new mechanism is up and running’.47 
Indeed, it seems that interparliamentary scrutiny will continue. However, the exact form 
that this interparliamentary oversight will take in the future is yet unknown. Several 
proposals have been already made, e.g. creation of a defence version of COSAC, however 
no final decision has been taken on this issue. 
 
3.2.2 The European Council 
The Lisbon Treaty brings minor changes to the role of the European Council. The European 
Council, the leading EU institution, retains its minor role in decision-making within CSDP. 
As Whitman and Juncos have noted, ‘the existing institutional hierarchy of CFSP (and 
consequently of CSDP) is retained with the European Council setting broad objectives’.48   
This decision-making body, acting unanimously, continues to define the general guidelines, 
but now also identifies the Union’s strategic interest and determines the objectives of 
CSDP49 by adopting the necessary decisions.50 The Lisbon Treaty also explicitly provides that 
not only the Council, but also the European Council is involved in the implementation of 
CSDP.51 Lastly, the European Council is granted the power to appoint and end the term of 
office of the High Representative,52 a power that previously belonged to the Council.53 
Thus, the High Representative is accountable also before the European Council. 
Generally speaking, the European Council retains its general strategic role and continues to 
set the general guidelines in CSDP. Wessels and Bopp maintain that the European Council’s 
tasks are ‘even reinforced’ in comparison to the Nice Treaty.54 However, the European 
Council continues not to be the most important player in CSDP compared to the Council. Its 
decisions, which are taken at higher political level, have a general character. Indeed, it is 
difficult for the European Council, a body that meets a few times a year, to address 
specific issues. Moreover, due to the fact that its summits are infrequent, it has a very slow 
decision-making mechanism; and in the area of crisis management speed in decision-making 
is crucial. Consequently, in practice, the role of the principal decision-maker in CSDP does 
not belong to the European Council but to the Council of ministers.    
 
3.2.3 The Council 
According to Article 16(6) TEU-L, the Foreign Affairs Council is competent for elaborating 
the Union’s external action, CSDP included. However, the division of the former General 
Affairs and External Relations Council into two separate Council configurations, i.e. the 
General Affairs Council and the Foreign Affairs Council, does not necessarily mean that the 
General Affairs Council is excluded from CSDP matters. As a body participating in the 
                                                
47European Security and Defence Assembly 2010. 
48Whitman and Juncos 2009, 32. 
49Article 26(1) TEU-L. 
50Article 22(1) TEU-L. 
51Article 24(1) TEU-L. 
52Article 18(1) TEU-L. 
53Article 207(2) of the consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
[hereinafter TEC]. 
54Wessels and Bopp 2008, 15. 
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preparation of the European Council meetings55 it is also involved in CSDP whenever CSDP 
issues are on the agenda of the sessions of the European Council.56 
The Lisbon Treaty does not bring any substantial changes as regards the tasks of the Foreign 
Affairs Council. As Wessels and Bopp note, ‘the tasks of the Council are reconfirmed with 
minor changes of terminology when compared to the current Nice Treaty’.57 However, 
although the competences of the Council remain unaffected, the Lisbon Treaty brings a 
couple of structural reforms within the institution of the Council. The new Council 
configuration, which deals with CSDP, the “Foreign Affairs Council”, has a fixed 
chairperson, i.e. the High Representative for a period of five years. Furthermore, the 
Political and Security Committee, a subordinate to the Council body, shall act not only at 
the request of the Council but also at the request of the High Representative and shall 
exercise the political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations under 
the responsibility of both.58 It is also provided that the Political and Security Committee 
shall assist the Council in the implementation of the Solidarity Clause.59 
Generally, as already noted above,60 the Council retains its role as the major decision-
maker in CSDP. Apart from a few structural reforms, the Lisbon Treaty generally does not 
affect the Council’s functions in the area of CSDP.  
 
3.2.4 The Commission 
The competences of the Commission within CSDP are ‘strictly delimited’.61 The Commission 
is not anymore ‘fully associated’ with the work carried out in CSDP,62 and the High 
Representative has succeeded it in this role. 
More specifically, the Commission does not have anymore the right to refer questions and 
to submit proposals to the Council with regard to the area of CSDP, but it may only provide 
support to the High Representative, when he/she refers any question relating to CSDP, and 
when he/she submits initiatives or proposals to the Council.63 Furthermore, it is outlined 
that the Commission is not competent to represent the Union in the area of CSDP64 and is 
not anymore ‘fully associated’ with the implementation of decisions taken within CSDP.65 
Moreover, in its role as contact person for the European Parliament, the Commission has 
been replaced by the High Representative. 
It is posited that nonetheless, the Commission’s voice is somehow “elevated”66 in the area 
of CFSP through the High Representative. The High Representative is, indeed, the foremost 
person in CFSP. However, the Commission does not seem to have a voice anymore in CFSP 
that can be “elevated”. The Commission does not actually have any competences in this 
area, and in any case the High Representative acts within CFSP under his/her Council hat 
                                                
55Article 16(6) TEU-L. 
56Wessels and Bopp 2008, 17. 
57Ibid. 
58Article 38 TEU-L. 
59Article 222 TFEU. 
60See above subchapter 3.2.2. 
61Dagand 2008, 6. 
62Article 27 TEU-N. 
63Article 30 TEU-L. 
64Article 17(1) TEU-L. 
65Article 18(4) in conj. with 18(2) TEU-N. 
66Dagand 2008, 6. 
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and not as a Vice-president of the Commission. It should be nevertheless recognised that 
the Commission having now control over the High Representative/Vice President of the 
Commission, is theoretically capable of restricting to a certain degree the freedom of 
action of the High Representative/Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council. 
In summary, it can be concluded that the Reform Treaty leaves a weakened Commission in 
favour of a stronger High Representative. The Commission is not anymore a player in CSDP, 
at least formally, since the limited CFSP powers that it previously possessed are transferred 
to the High Representative. 
 
3.2.5 The Court of Justice of the European Union 
Despite the abolition of the pillar structure, the Court of Justice has, as before, no 
jurisdiction in CSDP matters. Therefore, the Member States cannot be brought before the 
CoJ for non-compliance within the area of CSDP. However, Art. 24(1) TEU-L and 275 TFEU 
provide for two exceptions to this rule. 
According to the first exception, the CoJ has jurisdiction to monitor compliance with 
Article 40 of the TEU, which sets the borderline between the CFSP and other EU areas as 
regards the extent of powers and the decision-making competences. The second exception, 
which concerns the possibility of a natural or legal person to challenge a restrictive 
measure adopted within CSDP, does not seem to affect CSDP, an area which concentrates 
mainly on the conduct of military operations and civilian missions. Apart from the two 
aforementioned exceptions, it is maintained67 that the CoJ also has jurisdiction to provide 
its opinion with regard to the compatibility of an international agreement with the 
Treaties.68 
To conclude, although the old pillar structure is abandoned, the Court in principle 
continues to lack jurisdiction in the area of CSDP. Furthermore, the first exception to this 
rule not only fails to reflect the abolition of the old pillar division, but, on the contrary, 
aims at safeguarding the strict demarcation between CFSP and other Union fields. With 
regard to the second exception, it does not have any influence in military operations and 
civilian mission, with which the CSDP is primarily concerned. And finally, serious doubts 
have been raised concerning the power of the CoJ to provide opinions on international 
agreements. 
3.3 Decision-making and legal instruments 
3.3.1 Decision-making 
The Lisbon Treaty makes limited revisions with regard to decision-making in CSDP, where 
unanimity remains the only possible method, subject to three exceptions.69 Generally in 
CFSP, the use of qualified majority voting is allowed in several cases.70 However, it is 
excluded by virtue of Article 31(4) TEU-L when the decisions have military or defence 
implications. The possibility of further extension of the qualified majority voting by a 
unanimous decision of the European Council71 is also excluded for decisions that have 
                                                
67Keatinge and Tonra 2009, 17. 
68Article 218(11) TFEU. 
69Article 24(1) TEU-L, and 31(1) TEU-L. 
70Article 31(2) TEU-L. 
71Through the “CFSP passerelle clause” of 31(3) TEU-L. 
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military or defence implications. Paragraph 4 of 31 TEU-L refers to decisions with military 
and defence implications and not generally to decisions in the area of CSDP. Thus, it could 
be argued that a contrario, the provision of 31(4) TEU-L is not applicable to CSDP decisions 
that do not have defence and military implications (decisions concerning civilian 
components of CSDP).72 However, in any case qualified majority voting cannot be applied in 
CSDP due to the specific CSDP provision of Article 42(4) that provides for strict adherence 
to the unanimity rule in all CSDP decisions.73 Therefore, unanimity is initially presented as 
the sole decision-making method in CSDP. 
Nonetheless, new areas are added, in which the Council takes decisions exceptionally by 
qualified majority. First of all, the decision adopted by the Council for the purpose of 
establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of the participating 
Member States is taken by qualified majority voting.74 Moreover, as regards the “start-up 
fund”, which concerns the financing of defence policy missions, the Treaty allows the 
Council to adopt decisions establishing the procedures for setting up, financing, 
administering and controlling the start-up fund by a qualified majority.75 Finally, some 
aspects of the European Defence Agency, i.e. the decision of the Council defining the 
Agency’s statute, seat and operational rules, are also governed by the qualified majority 
voting procedure.76 
The reforms concerning the decision-making procedures confirm that in CSDP matters, the 
Member States, when facing the dilemma between sovereignty (veto rights) on the one 
hand and efficiency in decision-making on the other, prefer to guard their sovereignty.77 
Consequently, the nature of decision-making in CSDP remains intergovernmental.78 On the 
other hand, it is maintained that the few provisions that introduce the qualified majority 
voting in CSDP, reflect the desire of the Member States for more coherency within EU and 
for an effective decision-making process in an EU of 27 Member States.79 In any case, 
qualified majority voting is, in principle, excluded in CSDP, and thus decision-making in this 
area remains inflexible.     
 
                                                
72Civilian crisis management, i.e. police, strengthening of rule of law, strengthening of civilian 
administration, civil protection missions. The phrase ‘military and defence implications’ can be found 
also in Article 41 TEU-L, which concerns the financing of CFSP. This Article provides, as the former 
Article 28 TEU-N did, that expenditure arising from operations with military or defence implications 
shall not be charged to the Union budget. In Article 41, the term ‘military and defence implications’ 
refers to military operations and not to civilian missions of CSDP. This can be confirmed by the EU 
practice, which finances civilian CSDP missions, whereas for military operations, the Athena 
mechanism is set up (in order “to administer the financing of costs of EU operations having military or 
defence implications”). It can be concluded that the drafters of the Treaties, when referring to 
‘military and defence implications’, do not include civilian aspects of CSDP. Consequently the term 
‘military and defence implications’ of 31(4) also does not refer to civilian components of CSDP. 
Acceptance of a different interpretation would mean that the Treaty is inconsistent as regards the 
scope of this phrase within two different provisions. 
73Article Art. 42(4). 
74Article 46(2) TEU-L. 
75Article 41(3) TEU-L. 
76Article 45(2) TEU-L. 
77Wessels and Bopp 2008, 24; Report of The Federal Trust 2009, 30. 
78Dagand 2008, 5; Mölling 2008, 1. 
79Dagand 2008, 7. 
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3.3.2 Legal instruments 
The ‘joint actions’ and ‘common positions’ are replaced by ‘decisions defining actions to be 
undertaken by the Union’ and ‘decisions defining positions to be taken by the Union’ 
respectively.80 The ‘common strategies’,81 which were anyway redundant instruments, are 
omitted from the Treaty text. As before, the ‘general guidelines’ continue to be defined.82 
Although the names of the decisions have been modified by the Lisbon Treaty, their nature 
remains unchanged. They are still instruments distinct from decisions taken in other fields 
of Union action. Thus, it is supported that CSDP acts ‘should not generally be capable of 
having independent effects (such as direct effect and/ or primacy) within the domestic 
legal orders’.83 
As regards the conclusion of international agreements, the procedure followed is now 
provided for in Article 218 TFEU, and not in the Treaty on European Union. The major 
change introduced concerning the CSDP agreements is that the negotiations shall possibly 
be held exclusively by the High Representative, and not by the troika, as previously.84 
Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty explicitly excludes the adoption of legislative acts within 
CSDP.85 Therefore, the decisions taken in this field, although legally binding, cannot be 
classified as legislative acts. Apart from the fact that legislative procedures are not 
applicable in CSDP, the characterization of the acts as non-legislative has certain other 
legal consequences. One consequence is that, according to Protocol 1,86 national 
parliaments cannot challenge draft non-legislative acts for violation of the principle of 
subsidiarity. Also, for the adoption of such acts the Council is not anymore under the duty 
of 16(8) TEU-L, i.e. to deliberate and vote in public. 
The modifications of the legal instruments are ‘modest’.87 They are limited to the names 
and not the essence of the provided acts. Thus, the acts adopted in CSDP remain distinct 
from legal instruments in other Union areas. This confirms that, despite the abolition of the 
pillar structure, CFSP (including CSDP) remains a special legal area.88   
                                                
80Article 25 TEU-L. 
81Article 12 TEU-N. 
82Article 12 TEU-N provided that the ‘principles of and general guidelines for’ the CFSP shall be 
defined, whereas now Article 25 TEU-L refers only to the ‘general guidelines’. 
83Dougan 2008, 625. 
84Article 24 TEU-N. 
85Article 24(1) and 31(1) TEU-L. 
86Protocol 1. 
87Wessels and Bopp 2008, 11. 
88Mölling 2008, 1. 
20  IES Working Paper 5/2010  
 
   
 
4 OTHER KEY INNOVATIONS 
4.1 Mutual defence clause and solidarity clause 
The Lisbon Treaty provides for a “mutual defence clause”89 and a “solidarity clause”.90 
These two innovations ‘promote the principles of solidarity with, and assistance to other 
Member States, principles on which the EU is based’.91 
 
4.1.1 The mutual defence clause 
This is a major innovation of the Lisbon Treaty, according to which the Member States are 
obliged to aid and assist other Member States that are victims of armed aggression on their 
territory. 
The Member States decide at national level the kind of help to be offered, and the help is 
also provided on a national basis. Thus, the aid and assistance is not afforded by the 
European Union but by the Member States.92 In the Treaty text it is provided that the 
Member States are under the obligation to aid and assist the states-victims ‘by all the 
means in their power’. It is presumed that this phrase implies that, if necessary, the states 
should use even military assistance. Consequently, this clause is quite innovative, because 
it imposes the obligation to conduct military operations, within the framework of CSDP, in 
the territory of other Member States. However, Keatinge and Tonra give a different 
interpretation to the phrase.93 According to them it refers to the legal means of each 
member state, and thus the Member States are obliged to provide aid and assistance to 
other states-victims of aggression, only to the extent that their domestic legal order (e.g. 
national Constitution) allows this. 
The new provision, as it was argued before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
“echoes” Art. V of the Brussels Treaty,94 and was characterised as ‘a very soft WEU Article 
V-type guarantee’.95 Others went even further and supported that, when compared to the 
WEU Treaty, one could find ‘striking similarities […] with […] the modified Brussels Treaty’ 
and that ‘the Lisbon Treaty formula matches the guarantee of the Brussels Treaty and goes 
beyond it with a reference to NATO’.96 
In any case, the mutual defence clause is the successor of Article V of the WEU Treaty. 
Already before the entry into force of the Reform Treaty the WEU had transferred most of 
its competences to the EU, and the essential remaining purpose for this organization was 
the framing of a mutual defence clause. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
Member States of the WEU, which are also EU Member States, decided that there is no 
reason for continuation of their cooperation within the WEU, since the latter ‘has 
                                                
89Article 42(7) TEU-L. 
90Article 222 TFEU. 
91Dagand 2008, 8. 
92Angelet and Vrailas 2008, 30. 
93Keatinge and Tonra 2009, 17. 
94Report of The Federal Trust 2009, 34; Dagand 2008, 8. 
95Whitman 2008, 14. 
96Quille 2008, 8. 
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accomplished its historical role’,97 and since a mutual defence clause is now provided for in 
the EU Treaty. 
However, it can be deduced that the substitution of the WEU defence clause for a mutual 
defence clause in a Treaty reform, and the subsequent dissolution of the WEU, was the 
original intention of the drafters of the Treaties already since 2003, when the 
Constitutional Treaty was drafted. This is indicated by the fact that the decision for the 
dissolution of the WEU Treaty was announced on 31.03.2010, only four months after the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which introduces a mutual defence clause almost 
identical to the one provided for in the original Convention draft for the Constitutional 
Treaty, and which omits, like the Constitutional Treaty, any reference to the WEU.98 
Generally, it is supported that the defence clause of the Lisbon Treaty is not of the same 
nature as Article V of the WEU Treaty.99 In comparison to the clause of the original 
Convention draft for the Constitutional Treaty (2003), which was almost identical to Article 
V of the Brussels Treaty, and which was the starting point for an EU defence clause, the 
Lisbon defence clause seems to be less binding.100 The Lisbon Treaty uses the wording ‘the 
other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance’, and not as 
in the draft Constitution, ‘the other Member States assist’. Furthermore, unlike the draft 
Constitutional Treaty, the Reform Treaty does not mention the phrase ‘military’ (aid and 
assistance). Article V of the Brussels Treaty also explicitly refers to ‘military assistance’. An 
analogous phrase (‘armed force’) is explicitly mentioned in the NATO Treaty as well. Such 
phraseology, which is related to military alliances, is missing from the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The provision is further weakened by the introduction of the duty to respect the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States, as well as the duty 
for consistency with the commitments under NATO. The reason for this “watering down” of 
the provision is that certain Member States did not accept that the EU was a military 
alliance, and did not want to see it become one in the future. As the French Senator Huber 
Haenel aptly commented, ‘the mutual defence clause appears more as a petition of 
principle and no longer as a substitute for the mutual defence clause of the WEU’.101 
Nevertheless, the mutual defence clause is, after all, the successor of the WEU defence 
clause, and the Presidency of the WEU maintained that with the Lisbon Treaty ‘we remain 
strongly committed to the principle of mutual defence of Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty’.102 
The final wording of the Lisbon defence clause can only be explained if one takes into 
account the big controversy during the negotiations concerning this provision. The drafters 
of the Treaty were confronted with the demands of three groups of Member States:103 a) 
‘those seeking a mutual defence commitment’, b) ‘those seeking to protect their 
traditional neutral status’, and c) ‘those wanting to ensure that the Article would not 
undermine NATO’, and which felt that the provision fell short of the WEU clause, because 
the phrase ‘close cooperation with NATO’ (a phrase also present in the draft Constitutional 
                                                
97Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU 2010. 
98Article 17(4) TEU-N provided that cooperation within the EU security and defence shall not prevent 
the cooperation under the WEU. 
99Walter 2009b, 14. 
100Combarieu 2008, 4. 
101Ibid., where Huber Haenel is quoted. 
102Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU 2010. 
103Quille 2008, 8. 
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Treaty) was missing from the Treaty text.104 Finally, the clause, as it is expressed in the 
Reform Treaty, tries to satisfy all three groups. The first group sees a mutual defence 
obligation introduced in the Treaty text. The Treaty satisfies the second group by ensuring 
that the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States 
shall be respected. And finally, the Treaty, as requested by the third group, ensures the 
consistency of the clause with commitments under NATO.   
In conclusion, the wording of the mutual defence clause reflects the conflict of views 
between, on the one hand the Member States that did not like the fact that it resembled  a 
clause of a military alliance, because either they wanted to ensure their neutrality or 
because they did not want NATO to be undermined, and on the other hand, those Member 
States that desired a strong mutual defence commitment. Thus, the wording of the mutual 
defence clause of the Reform Treaty is a result of a big compromise. The clause resembles 
the mutual defence clause contained in military alliances, especially in the WEU, but 
nevertheless falls short of the WEU commitment. As illustrated above, the original 
intention (2003) seems to have been the creation of a mutual defence clause, which would 
succeed the one contained in the WEU Treaty. The clause that was finally produced, indeed 
succeeds the WEU clause, however, it does not seem to be worthy of its predecessor. In any 
case, the mutual defence clause does not change the nature of the Union by transforming it 
into a military alliance. 
 
4.1.2 The solidarity clause 
This is a new legal mechanism of assistance in the case that ‘a member state is the object 
of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster’.105 
A question which could be raised is whether the term “terrorist attack” falls within the 
meaning of “armed aggression” of the mutual defence clause. In other words, in case of a 
terrorist attack, could the mutual defence clause be invoked instead of the solidarity 
clause? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to consider that the solidarity 
clause, as it was initially inspired by the European Council106 after the terrorist attack in 
Madrid, was the tool destined to achieve solidarity among the EU states in the event of a 
terrorist attack. If the drafters of the Treaties had considered that the mutual defence 
clause also covered the fight against terrorism, it is most probable that the solidarity clause 
would not have been introduced into the Treaty framework. Consequently, the mutual 
defence clause, like its predecessor, the WEU defence clause, seems to be restricted to 
“conventional” armed aggression deriving from states.     
For the purposes of this provision the Member States are under the duty to coordinate 
between themselves in the Council, and the arrangements for the implementation of the 
solidarity clause are defined by a Council decision. Where the decision has defence 
implications, the Council acts in accordance with Article 31(1), i.e. by unanimity. 
Therefore, the Member States cannot be forced to provide military assistance, if they do 
not agree with such an action. Finally, the assistance is put into effect only after the 
request of the political authorities of the victim-Member State. 
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Doubts have been raised concerning the legal nature of the solidarity clause.107 In any case, 
be it a legal provision or a political principle, the solidarity clause is an important 
innovation introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, which allows the EU to mobilise its military 
resources for the purpose of providing assistance to a Member State.    
4.2 The new forms of flexible cooperation 
The new forms of cooperation offer more flexibility for action in the field of CSDP. Taking 
into consideration that unanimity is in most of the cases the rule, and the fact that the 
recent enlargements of the EU have increased the Union’s internal heterogeneity, they are 
very necessary mechanisms for the CSDP.108 
 
4.2.1 Enhanced cooperation 
The enhanced cooperation procedure provides for closer cooperation in fields where not all 
Member States want to cooperate. The Nice Treaty allowed such cooperation for the 
implementation of joint actions and common positions in CFSP matters, excluding it, 
however, from matters with military and defence implications.109 The Lisbon Treaty omits 
the provision, which excluded enhanced cooperation in military and defence matters, thus 
increasing the flexibility in the EU security and defence policy. 
For the establishment of enhanced cooperation, participation of a minimum number of nine 
Member States is required, and therefore this mechanism cannot be used as the framework 
for multilateral cooperation of less than nine Member States, as previously were the 
European Corps, Euromarfor, Eurofor, the Air Transport Cell, and the European 
Gendarmerie Force.110 
The extension of the range of the enhanced cooperation mechanism in CSDP reinforces the 
flexibility in this field. However, serious doubts have been raised concerning whether this 
possibility will seem useful in this area in the future.111 The supporters of this pessimistic 
view argue that, although enhanced cooperation was already provided for in the Nice 
Treaty as regards CFSP, it remained just a theoretical possibility.  The reason is that the 
CSDP (and generally CFSP) is traditionally an area where consensus is preferred. Thus, it 
remains to be seen whether the Member States will make use of this opportunity for 
flexible cooperation in CSDP.    
 
4.2.2 Permanent structured cooperation 
“Permanent structured cooperation”112 is a new flexible cooperation mechanism for 
military capabilities development and pooling of military assets. More specifically, this 
mechanism aims at the deepening of co-operation in different defence-related areas such 
as capability development, operations, training, logistics, joint acquisitions.113 Therefore, it 
is related only to the development of military capabilities. The civilian capabilities 
                                                
107Angelet and Vrailas 2008, 31. 
108Wessels and Bopp 2008, 26. 
109Article 27B TEU-N. 
110Combarieu 2008, 4. 
111Report of The Federal Trust, 32; Wessels and Bopp 2008, 26; Joint study by CEPS et al. 2007, 136. 
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development is not a concern of this mechanism and there is nothing comparable provided 
for it in the Treaty. Moreover, Permanent Structured Cooperation is not concerned with the 
conduct of military operations, deployment of groups or mutual defence, but is limited to 
the enhancement of operational capabilities. Therefore, the group is not entitled to launch 
a military operation on behalf of the Union, something that can be done only within the 
framework of the coalitions of the able and willing.114 Lastly, it differs from enhanced 
cooperation, because permanent structured cooperation is ‘predetermined in scope and has 
specific procedures and requirements’.115 
Permanent structured cooperation is a voluntary cooperation mechanism. In particular 
Member States participate in it on an opt-in basis, and thus no obligation is imposed on 
them by the Treaty to undertake such a commitment. The special characteristics of this 
mechanism are as follows:116 a) it is a permanent commitment (a ‘permanent measure’)117, 
b) it has a structured nature, and c) the eligibility assessment is based on performance. 
The original aim of this form of cooperation was ‘defence within the European Union 
leading to the formation of a European army, an aspiration often expressed by Germany’.118 
Thus the initial ambition of the drafters of the Treaties was the creation of a permanent 
reserve of European forces, which would constitute the basis for the creation of a future 
common European defence. For the purpose of achieving this aim, Article 2(b) of Protocol 
10,119 provides that ‘Member States participating in permanent structured cooperation shall 
undertake to bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, 
particularly by harmonizing the identification of their military needs, by pooling and, where 
appropriate, specialising their defence means and capabilities, and by encouraging 
cooperation in the fields of training and logistics’. 
Certain decisions concerning the Permanent Structured Cooperation, i.e. establishment, 
accession, withdrawal and suspension, are taken by qualified majority voting. These 
possibilities are some of the few exceptions to the rule of unanimity in CSDP. However, as 
mentioned above, permanent structured cooperation is limited to capabilities 
development. Therefore, the decision taken by qualified majority voting is not related to 
the launch of military operations on behalf of the Union, something which would still 
require a unanimous decision of the Council. In addition to that, all other decisions 
concerning PermStrucCoop shall be taken by unanimity.120 
For the establishment of permanent structured cooperation, no minimum number of 
Member States is required. However, unclear eligibility criteria are set for the Member 
States. Article 1 of Protocol 10 attempts to specify the general criteria set out in Article 
42(6) (‘fulfil higher criteria’, ‘have made more binding commitments’). Nevertheless, it is 
not certain whether the wording of the Protocol, which incorporates the Helsinki Headline 
Goals 2010, and the Battle-group concept, will allow for purely capability criteria or 
political considerations to prevail.121 
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The process and the criteria set out are compared with the process and the criteria of the 
Economic and Monetary Union.122 Like the EMU, the permanent structured cooperation also 
sets out ‘functional benchmarks’, however the criteria defined in the EMU are much more 
specific. 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the European Defence Agency, which is also involved in 
military capabilities development within the Union, has been assigned the task to evaluate 
the performance of the Member States’ commitment to permanent structured 
cooperation.123 
In sum, permanent structured cooperation is a closer military cooperation mechanism 
created to overcome ‘the traditional political taboo over unanimity’ in military and 
defence matters.124 It encourages the enhancement of European military capabilities, and 
motivates the Member States to meet the Helsinki Headline Goal 2010. The idea behind this 
mechanism is the launch of a cooperation scheme in the field of capabilities development 
initially between the strongest military states. Thus, at a first stage only a ‘hard core’125 of 
the biggest EU countries will participate in this cooperation. This will become an incentive 
for the other Member States to enhance their military capabilities in order to join the group 
of the “strong”. Consequently, through this form of cooperation the Union will be provided 
with more responsive forces, and the ground will be prepared for a future European 
defence. The criticism against this new mechanism is that it may create ‘a two-speed 
Europe’, in which the smaller Member States willing to follow would not be able to achieve 
the objectives due to shortfalls in financial or human resources.126    
 
 
4.2.3 Coalitions of the able and willing 
This is another deep EU military integration mechanism, which institutionalises the 
development of a previous practice, i.e. the Artemis mission in Congo. However, as 
characterised by Whitman and Juncos, it is much more ‘light-touch’ than the permanent 
structured cooperation.127 The “coalitions of the able and willing”, provided for in Article 
42(5), is another flexible cooperation form, by which a group of Member States which are 
willing and have the necessary capabilities for the execution of a task, are entrusted to 
execute it. Hence, the mission is led by the members of the coalition, although it is 
conducted in the name of the EU. This mechanism concerns the conduct of operational 
tasks by a group of interested Member States, and provides for flexibility at an operational 
level. 
The coalitions of the able and willing have been already used in practice before the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty. However, it should be noted that the formal recognition of 
such a practice by the Treaty gives to it more legitimacy and transparency, and avoids 
controversies.128 
                                                
122Missiroli 2008, 16; Angelet and Vrailas 2008, 44. 
123Art. 3 of Protocol 10. 
124CEPS et al. 2007, 137. 
125As was noted by Pierre Lellouche, quoted in Dagand 2008, 8. 
126Dagand 2008, 8. 
127Whitman and Juncos 2009, 44. 
128Report of The Federal Trust 2009, 33; Joint study by CEPS et al. 2007, 136; Dagand 2008, 7. 
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4.3 Rapid access to the Union budget and start-up fund 
The Nice Treaty did not provide for a mechanism ensuring rapid funding of civilian 
operations and military missions. Thus, the slow financing procedures delayed the launch of 
these operations, and in cases of urgency, the EU was incapable of reacting rapidly due to 
the red tape concerning the funding of crisis management. 
Today the Lisbon Treaty on the one hand retains the normal procedure for financing of 
CSDP, and on the other hand guarantees rapid access to the Union budget for preparatory 
activities for the tasks mentioned in 42(1) and 43 TEU-L, provided that these activities can 
be charged to the Union expenditure. Therefore, rapid access to the Union budget is 
ensured for preparatory activities for civilian missions, which are charged to the Union 
budget.129 For the activities that are not charged to the Union expenditure,130 the third 
paragraph of Article 41 provides for the creation of a start-up fund made up of Member 
States’ contributions for the purpose of financing of such operations. This mechanism is 
similar to the existing ATHENA mechanism used for the administration of common costs of 
the operations that have military or defence implications. However, in both cases (civilian 
and military spending) the mechanisms provided for in 41(3) are limited to preparatory 
activities for the tasks of 42(1) and 43 TEU-L. This means that it is limited to urgent actions 
concerning possibly only the planning and launching of the operations, and it does not cover 
further activities. 
Generally, Article 41 TEU-L affords rapid access to funds for preparatory activities of CSDP 
missions and operations, thus ensuring more flexibility of Union action in cases of urgency. 
The role of the European Parliament is limited as regards this provision. On the one hand, 
since the start-up fund consists of Member States’ contributions and not of Union funds, the 
European Parliament has no democratic overview over the start-up fund. However, 
democratic control is exercised at national level, since the national parliaments have the 
possibility to scrutinise their governments, which contribute to the fund, and thus there is 
no democratic deficit concerning the start-up fund mechanism. On the other hand, as 
regards the setting up of the mechanism for rapid access to the Union budget, the 
European Parliament, which in principle has budgetary control over Union expenditure, 
shall only be consulted in this case 41(3). This raises a democratic legitimacy issue, since 
neither the national parliaments nor the European Parliament have the possibility to 
scrutinise the rapid access to the Union budget for preparatory activities of civilian 
missions. 
                                                
129According to Article 41 TEU-L operating expenditure arising from operations that do not have 
military or defence implications shall be charged to the Union budget. Civilian components of CSDP 
do not have military and defence implications. Thus, the latter are also charged to the Union budget. 
130According to 41(2) TEU-L, operating expenditure arising from operations having military or defence 
implications e.g. military operations, swift procurement procedures, shall not be charged to the 
Union budget but to the Member States. 
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5 FURTHER INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 
5.1 The European Defence Agency 
The Treaty on European Union refers for the first time to a European Defence Agency 
(EDA). However, the EDA was established in July 2004 and is already fully operational. The 
Reform Treaty gives a firmer legal basis to the EDA; the legal basis is now the EU Treaty 
and not just an atypical joint action. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty incorporates the already 
existing EDA, which coordinates and supports tasks for the Member States in the field of 
defence capabilities development, research, acquisitions and armament. 
Article 42(3) and 45(1) list the tasks of EDA. The mandate of this body remains, in 
principle, the same. However, Angelet and Vrailas support that Article 45(1e), according to 
which the EDA shall ‘contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful 
measure […] improving the effectiveness of military expenditure’, extends the mandate of 
the EDA, by giving ‘the Agency real leverage in forcing participating Member States to bring 
about substantial improvements in their budgets’.131 Another change introduced by the 
Reform Treaty is that the EDA plays now a role in the implementation of permanent 
structured cooperation, by assessing participants’ performance as regards capabilities 
development.132 
Participation in the Agency is open to any Member State. Article 45(2) makes clear that 
Member States can participate in the EDA on an opt-in basis. Thus, the voluntary character 
of membership within EDA is retained. 
A decision taken by the Council by qualified majority voting shall define the statute, seat 
and operational rules of the Agency. Article 45(2) also provides for the setting of specific 
groups of Member States (sub-groupings) within the Agency for the realisation of joint 
projects. 
With regard to its nature, the European Defence Agency is intergovernmental. Participants 
are the Member States, which function under the authority of the Council. The tasks of EDA 
are carried out in liaison with the Commission, only where this is necessary, e.g. in the 
areas of industrial policy, public procurement. 
To sum up, Articles 42(3) and 45 codify existing practice and provide for a firmer legal basis 
for this CSDP body. This, according to Dagand, indicates the Member States’ desire to 
reinforce the Agency’s leading role in operational capabilities development.133 
5.2 The European External Action Service 
The EEAS shall assist the High Representative in fulfilling his/her mandate. As regards its 
functions it is considered comparable to national foreign ministries. However, as the 
                                                
131Angelet and Vrailas 2008, 43. 
132Article 3 of Protocol 10. 
133Dagand 2008, 7. 
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Council decision establishing the organization and functioning of the European External 
Action Service134 indicates, it will also deal with CSDP matters. 
The Council decision provides, inter alia, that the EEAS shall support the High 
Representative in fulfilling his/her mandate to conduct the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (and thus CSDP). Moreover, the EEAS will incorporate crisis management structures, 
such as the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and 
Conduct Capability (CPCC), the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the EU Situation Centre 
(SitCen) ‘in order to enable the High Representative to conduct the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP)’.135 These structures are placed under the direct authority and 
responsibility of the High Representative in his/her capacity of High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
The EEAS will be a central body for CSDP, since it will support the High Representative in 
conducting this policy, and it will incorporate already existing CSDP structures. The EEAS’ 
tasks go beyond CFSP/CSDP issues. Thus, by blending CFSP/CSDP elements with elements of 
the abolished Community pillar, the EEAS will aim at achieving a more coherent external 
policy.136 
                                                
134Decision 2010/427/EU of the Council of the European Union establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service. 
135Report of the EU Presidency on the European External Action Service 2009, 3. 
136Missiroli 2008, 12. 
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6 CSDP AND NATO 
The issue of the relationship between the EU security and defence policy and NATO has 
been raised since the inauguration of the European Security and Defence policy. The Lisbon 
Treaty refers to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in two cases in the TEU-L. 
The obligation to respect the NATO obligations of EU Member States is expressed two times 
in the same article. The Lisbon Treaty first sets out the general obligation for respect of 
the commitments under NATO,137 and then repeats this obligation in 42(7) TEU-L, 
specifically with regard to the mutual defence clause. As mentioned above138 this reflects 
the pressure exercised during the negotiations by the Member States, proponents of a 
collective defence within NATO, which had serious fears that an increasingly growing CSDP 
could undermine the North Atlantic Alliance. 
On the other hand, the provision which safeguarded that closer cooperation between two 
or more Member States in the framework of NATO would not run counter to or impede the 
cooperation under CSDP,139 is omitted from the Treaty text. A possible explanation for this 
omission could be that the drafters of the Treaty felt confident that an emerging CSDP is 
not threatened to be undermined by the cooperation under NATO. 
Despite the fact that the Lisbon Treaty refers to NATO, it does not go further to define the 
kind of relationship the EU should have with it, and does not entertain the issue of 
cooperation between the two organizations. However, although the former Treaty also did 
not deal with this issue, EU and NATO managed to remain partners, and to retain a 
complementary relationship. In particular, NATO has not shown interest in undertaking 
civilian operations, whereas the majority of EU missions have a civilian character. 
Furthermore, concerning the military operations, the EU has chosen to deploy in principle 
only where NATO is absent. In rare cases it appears that there is unnecessary duplication of 
capabilities. Nevertheless, the latter problem can be dealt with only on a case-by-case 
basis, since duplication in certain cases may be considered ‘necessary’.140 It seems that 
these issues can be better determined by politics under the specific political circumstances 
than by an abstract legal text such as the Lisbon Treaty. 
Generally speaking, the Lisbon Treaty continues to ensure that cooperation within CSDP 
will respect the NATO commitments. In addition to that it provides for a ‘stronger 
reference to NATO’141 as the foundation for collective defence. Nevertheless, the exact 
relationship between CSDP and NATO as well as the details concerning the cooperation 
between the two remain undefined by the Treaty. 
                                                
137Article 42(3) TEU-L. 
138See above subchapter 4.1.1. 
139Article 17(4) TEU-N. 
140Angelet and Vrailas 2008, 54. 
141Whitman and Juncos 2009, 7. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
7.1  The shortfalls 
The Lisbon Reform introduces a new ambition in the EU security and defence area by 
labelling it as a “common policy”. Nevertheless, this new ambition of creating a common 
policy is not accompanied by the necessary reforms which would set the essential 
institutional framework for the realisation of this objective. And it is due to the 
unwillingness of the Member States to transfer powers to the Union in this sensitive area 
that the Reform Treaty falls short of its goal.   
In particular, the Common Security and Defence Policy (and generally CFSP) remains a 
distinct area, which has its own rules and procedures. Although the pillar structure is 
abolished, CSDP continues to be governed more or less by the same intergovernmental 
aspects. More specifically, the Lisbon Treaty has adhered to the rule of unanimity, and 
thus, with regard to CSDP matters, this reform has failed to ensure an efficient decision-
making system in a Europe of 27. The influence of the Member States is strong, also 
because they share with the High Representative the right of proposal. Moreover, the 
“supranational” institutions (Commission, European Court of Justice, European Parliament) 
are almost completely excluded from this area. 
As regards the available legal instruments, the acts provided for by the Treaty, although 
renamed, seem to retain their former nature, as instruments of a separate legal area. 
Furthermore, the adoption of legislative acts is excluded in CSDP, with this having several 
legal consequences.   
Concerning the democratic nature of CSDP, although the European Parliament is generally 
reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty, its role remains weak, particularly in CSDP. However, this 
does not raise a democratic legitimacy issue. Since the veto right is retained in EU security 
and defence matters, the states have a strong voice, and consequently, the national 
parliaments preserve the real democratic control over CSDP. Besides, in the policy area of 
security and defence, it is often required that decisions are taken fast and in a discreet 
manner. Thus, the conferral of more powers to the European Parliament would result in 
unnecessary complications and delays, since the EP sessions are held in public and are 
accompanied by lengthy procedures. 
Generally, the rebranding of the policy field as “common” does not reflect the reality. It is 
true that the Lisbon Treaty offers new legal possibilities for enhancement of the EU 
security and defence policy, but CSDP remains, nevertheless, an area of cooperation 
between the Member States and is not really a common Union policy. In particular, the EU 
security and defence policy remains subordinated to the national policies, since the veto 
right is retained and since CSDP is out of the reach of the supranational institutions. The 
precedence of the national policies over CSDP is even confirmed in the Treaty text, which 
repeats in two provisions that CSDP shall not prejudice the specific character of the 
security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of its 
Member States under NATO.142 Perhaps the characterization of the policy field as 
                                                
142Article 42(2) and 42(7) TEU-L. 
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“common” has a symbolic and political significance, however, from a legal point of view it 
is not accurate. 
 
7.2 Has the Lisbon Treaty enhanced the CSDP, and what has the reform 
offered? 
Pending the eight-year period for the reform of the Nice Treaty, the area of the EU security 
and defence policy did not stop developing. On the contrary, before the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, important developments had already taken place in this field. The 
creation of the European Defence Agency, the establishment of coalitions of the able and 
willing, the informal conferral of more powers to the High Representative were some of the 
major developments which were realised in the living architecture of CSDP already before 
the Reform Treaty had taken effect. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty in principle codifies, 
consolidates and institutionalises existing policies, practices, and procedures. 
The CSDP has now a separate section in the TEU-L, which illustrates its increased 
importance. However, the CSDP does not owe this significance to the Lisbon Treaty, but 
the Reform Treaty seems just to reflect the growing importance of the EU security and 
defence policy. And from a legal perspective, even if the Lisbon Treaty would not have 
entered into force, most of the developments within CSDP could have been realised under 
the former treaty basis.143 Nevertheless, it should be recognised that the Reform Treaty has 
been the motive force for the introduction of important new features and innovations, 
which will allow the development of CSDP. 
In particular, the Lisbon Treaty created a post of a reinforced High Representative 
supported by a European External Action Service. The new powers given to the High 
Representative make him/her more effective and efficient not only in the representation of 
the Union, but also in the implementation and coordination of the Common Security and 
Defence Policy. 
Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty introduces a mutual defence as well as a solidarity clause. 
Although the mutual defence clause of the Reform Treaty is of a weaker legal nature than 
the one provided for in the draft Constitutional Treaty, the former constitutes the 
successor of Article V of the WEU Treaty.   
Another contribution of the Lisbon Treaty to CSDP is the introduction of flexible 
cooperation mechanisms, and especially the permanent structured cooperation. These new 
forms of cooperation offer more possibilities for Union action in the area of CSDP, where 
unanimity, which often leads to stalemates, remains the only possible decision-making 
method. However, it remains to be seen, if, and to which extent, Member States will use 
these possibilities as alternatives to the unanimity rule. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the mutual defence clause and the permanent 
structured cooperation set the foundations for a future common European defence. 
Whereas the mutual defence clause offers the political legitimacy for such a common 
defence, permanent structured cooperation affords the possibility for establishment of 
permanent defence structures, which shall form the basis of a future European army. 
                                                
143Whitman and Juncos 2009, 37-39. 
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The cooperation form of permanent structured cooperation generally promotes the 
development of military capabilities. This is the main mandate also of the European 
Defence Agency, a body initially established and inaugurated outside the Treaty 
framework, but now incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty. 
Lastly, the Lisbon Treaty provides for mechanisms that ensure rapid funding of preparatory 
activities of operations and missions. The possibility for adopting procedures guaranteeing 
rapid access to the Union budget with regard to civilian missions, and the provision of a 
start-up fund for military operations, are essential innovations in the field of crisis 
management, which often requires fast reflexes. 
Consequently, the developments of CSDP in the living architecture are incorporated into 
the Lisbon Treaty and the growing importance of the EU security and defence policy is now 
reflected in the Treaty text. The introduction of a new legal basis for the CSDP does not 
seem to offer much to the policy field, since the majority of the reforms could have taken 
place under the Nice Treaty. Nevertheless, what the Lisbon Reform has offered to CSDP 
was a good opportunity for significant changes, the introduction of which could have 
otherwise delayed. 
  
7.3 Ambiguities remain 
Several months after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, a number of questions, as 
regards the legal implementation of CSDP, have not yet been answered. First of all, the 
division of powers between the High Representative and the President of the European 
Council, concerning the representation of the Union in defence matters, and the duty to 
inform the European Parliament about CSDP developments, is not absolutely demarcated. 
The Treaty also does not define clearly the division of labour between several bodies and 
organs, such as between the High Representative and the Political and Security Committee, 
the Political and Security Committee and COREPER, and at lower level the High 
Representative’s representatives and COPERER, and the working groups, etc. 
With regard to permanent structured cooperation, the eligibility criteria are not sufficiently 
specified. Vague and very general criteria are set, which leave a big margin of appreciation 
as regards the eligibility of Member States to this cooperation form. Fears have been 
expressed that this will allow political considerations, and not purely capability criteria, to 
play the decisive role in the assessment of whether Member States fulfil the conditions for 
accession. 
Lastly, in their effort to create a more comprehensive external action, the drafters of the 
Treaties overloaded the High Representative with responsibilities. The Treaty does not 
mention anything concerning the sub-delegation of powers to deputies in order to allow the 
High Representative to fulfil more efficiently his/her essential duties. 
Since the Treaty of Lisbon does not clarify how the above issues shall be implemented, it is 
left to the practice to provide for solutions. Obviously, the interpretation and application 
of these ambiguous provisions will depend on the personality of the mandate-holders. 
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7.4 Suggestions for future reforms 
Of course, the Treaty reforms as regards CSDP will probably not come to an end with the 
Lisbon Treaty. If the Member States desire an enhanced CSDP, which will ensure a greater 
role of the Union on the international scene, it is crucial that shortfalls in CSDP are 
eliminated, and that future institutional reforms aim at a further integration in this field. 
Several suggestions are made to this end. 
First of all, it is suggested that the existing ambiguities, as regards the division of 
competences arising from the present Treaty reform, are clarified. The Treaties should be 
clear when conferring competences and should not rely on the good will of the mandate-
holders. Any possibility for future conflicts of competence, which would lead to legal 
uncertainty, should be eliminated.   
What is more, as a legal text, the Treaty should also be precise, when defining the legal 
conditions for the application of its provisions. Otherwise, it is not legal but political 
considerations that prevail in the implementation of the Treaty. More specifically, with 
regard to the eligibility conditions for admission to permanent structured cooperation the 
Treaty should determine the specific criteria for the assessment of the states by 
delineating the precise figures that ought to be accomplished. What does the phrase 
‘proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities’144 exactly mean? This wording 
does not offer a tangible goal to be achieved by the Member States. If the Treaty identified 
the exact numbers or percentages, the margin of political discretion would be substantially 
limited, if not completely eliminated.     
Moreover, as it is documented in the Civilian Headline Goal 2010,145 the Union has 
significant shortfalls in civilian capabilities, which hinder its ability to respond effectively 
to crisis management tasks. Although the largest portion of Union operations are civilian 
missions, and despite the considerable deficit in civilian capabilities, the Reform Treaty 
does not address this problem, whereas it provides only for mechanisms for military 
capabilities development. Thus, it would be constructive if future Treaty reforms 
institutionalised the development of civilian capabilities as well. 
Furthermore, it is obvious that the intergovernmental model is not very suitable for a 
deeper integration process in CSDP. The new forms of flexible cooperation, which do not 
require everybody to be onboard, and the constructive abstention, do not constitute a 
sufficient solution to the problem. Decision-making in CSDP continues to be ineffective, and 
thus, progress in this area will remain painfully slow. Consequently, the qualified majority 
voting procedure, which was exceptionally introduced in CSDP, could be gradually 
expanded in future reforms. Moreover, it is also obvious that a supranational institution, 
such as the Commission, which by definition acts under the common interest, would 
certainly be more willing to accelerate the integration process within CSDP than the 
Member States, which in practice act within the Council according to their national 
interests. If the Commission, an organ that since the Treaty reform has no voice in CSDP, 
would be granted a substantial role in the EU security and defence policy, a deeper 
integration in this field would be certainly advanced. 
More generally, the introduction of the phrase “common policy” into the Treaty text is not 
an accidental event. It clearly illustrates the initial intention of the inspirers of the reform 
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to set the objective of a common European defence and security policy. However, although 
this objective is set by the Lisbon Treaty, the treaty-drafters have failed to provide for the 
necessary means for the realisation of this ambition. It is therefore left to future reforms to 
overcome this fundamental shortcoming of the present Treaty. 
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